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Introduction 
The common law did not consider possession a constituent element of the actus reus based on the 
idea that possession was not equated with the external manifestation of mens rea. However, with 
the development of the criminal law, with an ever-increasing volume of criminal offences on the 
statute books,
1
 the concept of possession as an element of the actus reus became intrinsically 
important in the construction of criminal liability.
2
 Although it is passive rather than active 
possession is an element of certain offences that prohibit the mere possession of objects or 
substances considered harmful to the public such as illegal drugs,
3
 child pornography,
4
 offensive 
weapons,
5
 unlicensed firearms,
6
 and theft offences.
7
  
 
This article evaluates the intricacies of possession in the light of its various forms as an exception to 
the act requirement in the construction of criminal liability.  
 
Voluntary Act Requirement 
Commentators on the classic examination of actus reus typically challenge the voluntary act 
principle either construing it as a creature of legal doctrine or viewing it as a general metaphysical 
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truth about human actions. Status offences are compatible with the voluntary act requirement 
because acts may consist of a state of affairs instead of an event per se. Exceptions to the voluntary 
act requirement include possession offences that prohibit the state of possessing a prohibited object 
or substance. The meaning of ‘possession’ is a term of art in criminal law and defined in terms of 
either an act of acquiring possession or an omission to rid oneself of possession, which are 
prerequisites to criminal liability. Possession offences do not conflict with the voluntary act 
requirement, at least to any greater extent than that presented by omission liability considerations.
8
 
 
Defining Possession 
The word ‘possession’ remains one of the most elusive and ambiguous of legal constructs.9 In The 
People (DPP) v Ebbs,
10
 O’Donnell J opined: 
 
“Possession is unusual in the criminal law, in that what is criminalised is a state, rather than 
an activity. It is clear that the concept of possession in criminal law necessarily involves an 
irreducible element of knowledge. One fixed point in the otherwise confused law of 
possession is that a person does not possess something of which he or she is unaware….The 
point is also well illustrated in those drugs cases where it was necessary to consider whether 
the modern misuse of drugs legislation made possession of a drug a strict liability offence in 
the sense that it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused knew that he 
or she had a specific drug, or indeed a controlled drug at all…[T]he actus reus of possession 
involves knowledge that the person possesses ‘something’. In many cases this is illustrated by 
the negative proposition that a person cannot be said to possess something which is slipped 
into his or her handbag, pocket, or some other place over which he or she has control.”11 
 
A notable feature of this judicial statement is that knowledge required to establish possession 
pertains to the actus reus rather than the mens rea, that is to say, in the absence of proof that 
defendant was aware of the existence of the prohibited objects or substance or substance there is no 
proof of the physical element of possession.
12
 
 
The superior courts have grappled with a definitive meaning of possession in criminal law, typically 
invoking descriptive terms rather than definition.
13
 Warner v Metropolitan Police Commissioner
14
 
dealt with the question whether the defendant had been proved to have knowledge of the substance 
at issue (illegal drug). Lord Wilberforce defined possession as:  
 
“...a concept which is both central in many areas of our legal system, and also lacking in 
definition….In relation to it we find … law … working by description rather than by 
definition. Ideally, a possessor of a thing has complete physical control over it; he has 
knowledge of its existence, its situation and its qualities: he has received it from a person who 
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intends to confer possession of it and he has himself the intention to possess it exclusively of 
others. But these elements are seldom all present in situations with which the courts have to 
deal, and where one or more of them is lacking, or incompletely present, it has to be decided 
whether the given approximation is such that possession may be held sufficiently established 
to satisfy the relevant rule of law….Naturally this has led to a number of distinctions and even 
inconsistencies in borderline cases, such as where a person receives something without 
knowledge of either the existence or character of other things contained in it, or where he 
receives one thing thinking that it is something else, or that it has a different value or a 
different character from what it really has.”15 
 
While this is the ideal concept of possession in criminal law, it does not necessarily arise in all 
circumstances. The legal meaning of possession in the construction of criminal liability needs to be 
examined in relation to its legislative context and purpose.
16
  
 
The distinguishing features of possession and ownership, together with the nuances of possession, 
are inherently complicated. Possession does not have the same legal meaning as ownership in that 
the owner of an object or substance may not always possess the object or substance.
17
 To avoid 
confusion over exactly what is meant by possession, the word is frequently modified by adding a 
term describing the type of possession.
18
  
 
Knowledge of the Object or Substance 
A key element in possession offences is that the defendant has knowledge of the object or substance 
over which he has control, since without such knowledge control cannot be exercised. Possession is 
passive therefore the mental element is knowledge meaning the defendant is aware that he possesses 
the object or substance. A person does not possess something of which he is unaware. 
 
In The People (AG) v Nugent and Byrne,
19
 the defendants were convicted of receiving stolen money 
that was found in a car driven by the first defendant and in which the second defendant was a 
passenger. Their defence was that they did not know that the money was in the car. The Court of 
Appeal allowed the appeal holding that the onus of proof was on the prosecution to prove 
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the money was in the car. It was necessary for the 
prosecution to prove that the driver knew of the existence of the stolen money that was discovered 
in the car.
20
 Nugent and Byrne was applied in Minister for Posts and Telegraphs v Campbell,
21
 
where the defendant was charged with possession of an unlicensed television set in a house of 
which he was the occupier. The television licence inspector was let into the house by a woman who 
was in the house at the time that he called. Davitt P. noted that there was no evidence as to how the 
television set came to be in the house, nor as to whether the defendant had any knowledge of its 
presence, nor did he have any control over the woman who let the inspector in. On a consultative 
case stated the High Court held that the complainant (Minister) had not discharged the onus of 
showing that the defendant, at the relevant time, kept the television set or had it in his possession, 
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either actual or constructive, and that the District Justice accordingly would be correct in law in 
dismissing the charge. Davitt P. concluded that the evidence was consistent with the television set 
being put into the house without the knowledge or consent of the defendant. It was necessary for the 
prosecution to prove that the defendant knew of the existence of the unlicensed television set that 
was found on his premises.   
 
Proximity can be an important issue pertaining to the knowledge element of possession. In R v 
Whelan,
22
 the defendants were found by the police in a room occupied by 14 other people. A 
revolver and ammunition was found in the room on top of a cupboard and covered by clothes. Each 
of the three defendants denied possession of the gun and asserted that the gun had been ‘planted’ by 
the police. The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that although there was very strong evidence that 
somebody was guilty of an offence in connection with the revolver and ammunition, there was 
nothing to indicate which individual was guilty, and insufficient evidence on which to found the 
inference that all three persons were in possession. The convictions were quashed. Whelan was 
distinguished in The People (DPP) v Foley,
23
 where the three defendants were found in a room with 
firearms and ammunition. The objects were in reasonably plain view in the room. One of the 
defendants stated that he was there innocently, which the jury believed and he was acquitted. The 
other two were convicted. The essential point was that the firearms were out in the open. Foley was 
sitting on the bed beside a shotgun and a handgun was also clearly visible. The two defendants were 
convicted of possession by the Special Criminal Court, but a third defendant was acquitted on the 
basis of his explanation that he called to the premises only on a casual visit. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal concluded that it was impossible, in the absence of any explanation, to find that the 
defendant was innocently sitting on the bed alongside the gun without being part of an enterprise 
that he, together with the occupier of the house (who was convicted but did not appeal), should have 
possession of it as well as the handgun and ammunition. Budd J. stated: 
 
“The crucial difference between the material facts of R. v. Whelan and the applicant’s case is 
that the firearm was hidden under clothing in Whelan’s case, whereas in the applicant’s case 
the sawn-off shotgun was beside him clearly to be seen on the bed in the small bedsitter. In R. 
v. Whelan there was no evidence at all to suggest that any of the accused had any knowledge 
of the existence of the firearm nor was there any evidence from which an inference of intent 
to possess could be drawn. However, in the applicant’s case, it was entirely open to the 
Special Criminal Court, on the evidence of the witnesses called by the prosecution, to draw 
the inference that all three occupants of the room were in joint possession of the firearms and 
ammunition.”24  
 
The superior courts may draw reasonable inferences from the facts of the case, particularly where 
the defendants had clearly engaged upon a common enterprise. While all inferences are rebuttable 
by evidence to the contrary the court will more likely draw inference in circumstances where the 
defendant had an opportunity to gain knowledge of the existence of the prohibited object or 
substance.
25
  
 
Whelan and Foley are distinguished with regard to the inferences that the jury could draw from the 
facts tendered in evidence.
26
 In Whelan, the prosecution could not establish that the defendants 
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knew of the existence of the concealed weapons, whereas in Foley that knowledge could be inferred 
from the facts, that is to say, the visible proximity of the weapons to the defendants together with 
the absence of a reasonable explanation of the defendant’s presence in the room at the pertinent 
time.
27
 
 
In The People (DPP) v Byrne,
28
  the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the prosecution had first to 
establish possession which involved knowledge that the defendant had something and then the onus 
would shift to the defendant to seek to prove (on the balance of probabilities) that he did not know 
that what he had in his possession was a controlled drug. The Court held that the prosecution had to 
prove that each of the defendants had “and knew that he had, the bales in his control, that they 
further knew that the bales contained something....”.29 
 
In The People (DPP) v Power,
30
 the Supreme Court considered whether it was a necessary element 
in the offence contrary to section 15A of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 that the defendant was 
aware that the market value of the controlled drug alleged to be in his possession was greater than 
the statutory amount. The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal 
on the basis that the trial judge failed to direct the jury that it was necessary to prove that the 
accused was aware the value of the controlled drug alleged to be in his possession exceeded the 
statutory amount. The Court held that section 15A did not require knowledge of the value of the 
drugs involved in the offence. On further appeal to the Supreme Court on a point of law, the Court 
held that in the prosecution of an offence contrary to the section 15A it was not necessary for the 
prosecution to establish the defendant knew or ought to have known the market value of the 
controlled drugs. It is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant had in his possession 
controlled drugs above a certain value and it would not be necessary to establish that the defendant 
had actual knowledge of the value of the drugs. 
 
Control Over the Object or Substance 
The defendant must have actual or constructive control of an objects or substance to be legally in 
possession. In The People (AG) v Kelly and Robinson,
31
 the defendants were found in a room by the 
police in the presence of two others who appeared to be sorting through stolen goods. The two 
others pleaded guilty to stealing the goods, and the issue was whether the two defendants were also 
in possession of the stolen goods and therefore whether a conviction for receiving stolen goods 
would stand. The jury were instructed that unless they were satisfied that the defendants had control 
over the goods, or that the goods were being held for them, they should acquit the defendants. One 
of the defendant’s explanations for being in the room was that he was delivering eggs to the 
homeowner’s sick child, but the jury clearly did not believe his explanation and convicted him. The 
issue on appeal was whether the jury had been properly instructed on the meaning of possession in 
law and the Court of Criminal Appeal held that they were. However, if the jury had believed him, 
he would have been acquitted. Thus, on the facts of the case the issue was whether the meeting was 
held for the purposes of dividing the stolen goods, and the purpose of the defendant’s presence was 
essential to whether he possessed the goods.   
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In R v Murphy, Lillis and Burns,
32
 three men were found guilty on charges of being in possession of 
unlicensed firearms and ammunition. They appealed against conviction on the ground that the jury 
had been misdirected on the legal meaning of possession. The factual circumstances of the case 
were that three men had entered a premises consisting of a shop and dwelling-house. When the 
premises were searched by army personnel, the men were found in rooms, which contained two 
rifles and a quantity of ammunition. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the concept of 
possession connotes voluntary possession by actual or potential physical control, with knowledge of 
the nature of what is kept or controlled, and held that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the 
convictions. MacDermott L.C.J. stated: 
 
“Possession is an ambiguous word and one which ... is always giving rise to trouble. Its 
precise meaning must depend on the context and policy of the statute using it and no 
comprehensive definition is therefore possible or desirable.”33  
 
The question of momentary possession was considered. The Court suggested that picking up a 
pistol with a view to throwing it into the river would amount to possession, while picking it up with 
the intention of handing it in to the police would not. Thus, if the purpose of picking up the gun, or 
presumably some other objects or substance with similar characteristics, has a justifiable purpose, it 
will not constitute legal possession, while picking it up with the intention to abandon it does.  
 
Characteristics, Qualities and Quantities 
There is a distinction in criminal law between knowledge of the existence of an objects or 
substances and knowledge of its characteristics and qualities. If the offence charged is one of strict 
liability, then the prosecution need only establish knowledge of the existence of the item. In Warner 
v Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
34
 the defendant was charged with having drugs in his 
possession. His evidence was that he believed that a bottle in his possession contained scent while, 
in fact, it contained prohibited drugs. The House of Lords held that the prohibited conduct was a 
strict liability offence and, consequently, all the prosecution needed to establish was the defendant’s 
knowledge of the existence of the item. The question then arises as to what characteristics of the 
objects or substance the defendant needs to know. Lord Pearce stated: 
 
“Though I reasonably believe the tablets which I possess to be aspirin, yet if they turn out to 
be heroin I am in possession of heroin tablets. This would be so I think even if I believed 
them to be sweets. It would be otherwise if I believed them to be something of a wholly 
different nature. At this point a question of degree arises as to when a difference in qualities 
amounts to a difference in kind. That is a matter for a jury who would probably decide it 
sensibly in favour of the genuinely innocent but against the guilty.”35  
 
The object or substances in question must in every respect be physically distinct to exculpate the 
defendant of criminal liability. With regard to containers, the general rule of law is that a defendant 
will be held to have knowledge of anything in a container, which is in his possession as long as he 
thinks that there is something in the container. However, if the defendant thinks the container is 
empty, then knowledge will not be imputed. In Warner, it was held that knowledge will be imputed 
if the defendant had an opportunity to acquaint himself with knowledge of the contents of the 
container, but didn’t. Essentially, an inference will be made that the defendant has knowledge of the 
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contents and bears the onus of proving that in fact he did not have knowledge. It is a question for 
the jury to decide. 
 
The legal distinction between knowledge of an object or substance and knowledge of its qualities 
seems to have been clarified by the superior courts, especially in relation to cases where the 
defendant alleges the object or substance at issue were planted on his person or property. In R v 
McNamara,
36
 the defendant was found with a box that contained cannabis and he claimed that he 
thought the box contained pornographic or pirated video tapes. The defendant claimed not to have 
possessed the cannabis. The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction and held that once the defendant 
knew of the existence of a thing that is within his control he is deemed to possess it and a mistake as 
quality is insufficient to prevent the defendant from having possession. Lord Lane CJ, delivering the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal, propounded the following propositions of law based on the ratio 
decidendi of Warner: 
 
“First of all a man does not have possession of something which has been put into his pocket 
or into his house without his knowledge: in other words something which is ‘planted’ on him, 
to use the current vulgarism. Secondly, a mere mistake as to the quality of a thing under the 
defendant’s control is not enough to prevent him being in possession. For instance, if a man is 
in possession of heroin, believing it to be cannabis or believing it perhaps to be aspirin. 
Thirdly, if the defendant believes that the thing is of a wholly different nature from that which 
in fact it is, then the result … would be otherwise. Fourthly, in the case of a container or a 
box, the defendant’s possession of the box leads to the strong inference that he is in 
possession of the contents or whatsoever it is inside the box. But if the contents are quite 
different in kind from what he believed, he is not in possession of it.”37 
 
If the quantity of an object or substance in custody or control is minute, the question arises as to 
whether it so minute that it cannot be proved that the defendant knew he had it. If knowledge cannot 
be proved, possession would not be established.  
 
The ‘usability test’ in drug possession cases is problematic. The issue is not usability per se but 
possession. Quantity can be instrumental in two respects when the courts have to determine whether 
or not a defendant has a controlled drug in his possession: first, whether the quantity is sufficient to 
enable a court to find as a matter of fact that it amounts to something; secondly, whether it is 
visible, tangible, and measurable, it is certainly something. The issue is one of fact for the common 
sense of the jury. 
 
Constructive Possession 
Constructive possession pertains to a situation where a defendant is deemed to have control over the 
prohibited object or substance without actually having physical control. A defendant with 
constructive possession remains in the same legal position as a person with actual possession. 
Conversely, constructive possession segregates possession from custody. In other words, 
constructive possession is where the objects or substances are held by someone over whom the 
possessor exercises an element of control. In this context, the constructive possessor may call for 
the delivery of the goods and possesses them through the custodian.
38
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Constructive possession indicates that the object or substance is not on the defendant’s person, but 
is within the defendant’s area of control, such as inside a house or vehicle with the defendant. More 
than one defendant can be in possession although this would clearly be a constructive possession for 
at least one of them. Constructive possession is a legal theory used to extend possession to 
situations where a person has no hands-on custody. It exists where a defendant has knowledge in 
addition to the ability to control the object or substance, even if the person has no physical contact 
with it.
39
  
 
In Minister for Posts and Telegraphs v Campbell,
40
 judgment was given on a case stated from the 
District Court in respect of an unlicensed television set. The High Court held that the complainant 
had not discharged the onus of showing that the defendant, on the specified date, kept the television 
set or had it in his possession, actual or constructive. Davitt P. explained the elements of possession 
in the following terms: 
 
“…a person cannot, in the context of a criminal case, be properly said to keep or have 
possession of an article unless he has control of it either personally or by someone else. He 
cannot be said to have actual possession of it unless he personally can exercise physical 
control over it; and he cannot be said to have constructive possession of it unless it is in the 
actual possession of some other person over whom he has control so that it would be available 
to him if and when he wanted it. Normally speaking, a person can properly be said to be in 
possession of the contents of his own dwelling house, but only if he is aware of what it 
contains. He cannot properly be said to be in control or possession of something of whose 
existence and presence he has no knowledge. Assuming, for the sake only of the argument, 
that the evidence established that the cottage was the defendant’s dwelling house, there is in 
this case no evidence as to how the television set came to be there, how long it was there, or 
whether the defendant was ever at any time aware of its presence or existence. There is 
therefore no evidence that it was ever actually in his control or possession. There is no 
evidence as to who was the woman who was present in the house on the occasion of [the 
inspectors] or as to what was her relation, if any, to the defendant. There is nothing to indicate 
that he had any control over her actions. There are therefore no grounds for concluding that he 
had constructive possession of the television set. As far as the evidence goes, the set may have 
been placed in the cottage without his knowledge or consent.”41  
 
In Sullivan v Earl of Caithness,
42
 the defendant was charged with an offence of possessing firearms 
without holding a firearms certificate. He lived in Oxfordshire and kept the firearms in his mother’s 
house in Surrey. The defendant argued that he did not possess the firearm and therefore did not 
require a certificate. May J. stated:  
 
“Looking at the context of the word ‘possession’ ... I have no doubt that one can be in 
possession of a firearm even though one is at a place other than that at which the firearm 
physically is. To agree with the justices’ decision in the present case would in my view 
effectively be to equate the word ‘possession’ ... with custody, and this I am satisfied would 
be wrong....[T]he owner of a firearm who does not at the relevant time have physical 
possession of it can nevertheless truly be said still to be in possession of it. In the present case 
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the defendant was at all material times the owner of the firearms. He could no doubt obtain 
them from his mother’s flat at any time when he wanted them. She had the barest of custody 
of them, not because she had any interest in them, but because her flat was safer than the 
defendant’s home in Oxford.”43  
 
Although the defendant left firearms in his mother’s house, he was nevertheless deemed to have had 
constructive possession. Thus, the meaning of possession in the construction of criminal liability 
includes situations other than mere physical custody. 
 
In Williams v Douglas,
44
 the meaning of constructive possession was considered by the High Court 
of Australia. The defendant, Williams, while staying at a hotel, acknowledged that he owned certain 
gold bars, which were found in a bathroom some distance from his bedroom and which was used by 
all lodgers on the same floor as Williams. The contraband gold bars were held to be in William’s 
possession or control within the meaning of section 36 of the Gold Buyers Act 1921. Rich J. said: 
 
“Possession does not mean actual physical possession or manual detention. ‘Suppose I request 
a bystander to hold anything for me, it still remains in my possession. So also possession may 
be required or retained over goods which are in the manual detention of a third person’: R. v. 
Sleep (1861) Le. & Co. 44 ... per Willes J. And the phrase possession and control denotes the 
right and power to deal with the article in question. In the instant case the question resolves 
itself into one of fact. In any given case it is necessary to take into consideration all the 
circumstances and the nature of the thing the subject of the inquiry. In the circumstances of 
this case as the accused claimed the gold when it was ‘discovered’ I consider that the 
inferences which can be drawn are that the accused knew that the gold was concealed under 
the bath, that it was placed there by himself or an accomplice and to use the words of Dwyer 
C.J. that ‘he could have got it when he wished’. He had it as effectually under his control or 
his de facto possession as if he had locked it in a box in the bathroom, a box of which he and 
he alone had the key, or if you like he and an accomplice alone had keys.”45  
 
Latham C.L., with whom Dixon J. and McTiernan J. agreed, stated: 
 
“The result is much the same as if the word ‘actual’ had been written before the word 
‘possession’; but de facto possession is a conception which is itself much more extensive than 
that of physical custody. It is wide enough to include any case where the person alleged to be 
in possession has hidden the thing effectively so that he can take it into his physical custody 
when he wishes and where others are unlikely to discover it except by accident.”46  
 
This case is authority for the proposition that a person may be held in law to possess something, 
which could be many miles away from his person. 
 
Containers  
The contentious issue is that a defendant will typically claim that while he was aware of the 
existence of the container he did not know that it contained prohibited objects or substances. It is 
sufficient for the prosecution to establish that the defendant had control of the container, that he 
knew of its existence and that there was something in it, and that the something was in fact the 
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object or substance which the prosecution alleges it to be. The prosecution does not have to prove 
that the defendant knew that the item was a controlled drug.  
 
Warner and McNamara were concerned with possession of a parcel or a package and its contents, 
and the outcome of both cases suggests the prosecution only need to prove that the defendant knew 
of the existence of the contents but not their nature. Therefore, once the defendant becomes aware 
that the container holds something then he is deemed in law to possess the object or substance 
regardless of his mental state as to their nature. Conversely, the defendant will not be held to have 
possession of the contents if he honestly believed that the container was empty. In Warner, Lord 
Pearce
47
 and Lord Wilberforce
48
 suggested a defence in that the defendant might be said to be in 
possession of a parcel but not the contents. The court will consider the defendant’s state of mind in 
relation to the contents and may draw inferences that the defendant knew, or had the opportunity to 
become aware, of the existence of contents of which he clearly had control. The court may consider 
the weight, bulk, appearance and circumstances in which the packet was held. Ultimately, the court 
would be unlikely to accept the defence that the defendant mistakenly believed the container to be 
empty. 
 
If objects or substances have been surreptitiously placed in a container, such as a backpack, which 
of the defendant is aware, then he will not be deemed to have knowledge of the prohibited items. 
Cases such as Warner might be distinguished from the backpack scenario where the innocent party 
has prohibited objects or substances planted, by the fact that the defendant in Warner knew of the 
existence of the items of which some transpired to be prohibited. The defendant expected to collect 
containers of bottles of scent but instead received bottled containing drugs. Therefore, the defendant 
knew of the items, which it transpired, out to be prohibited. If the defendant in Warner had 
collected the container with bottles of scent, with a packet of prohibited drugs surreptitiously 
concealed then this would correlate to the backpack scenario ad the court would probably find that 
he did not possess the drugs, based on the fact that he would not have known of the existence of the 
concealed packet. Furthermore, the defendant in Warner had the opportunity to inspect the 
container.  
 
It is clear from the speeches of Lords Pearce
49
 and Wilberforce
50
 in Warner that there was a 
distinction to be made between the mere physical custody of an object or substance and its 
possession, and that possession connotes a mental element of some sort. Thus, if the defendant had 
not availed of all reasonable opportunities to familiarise himself with the content, and the 
circumstances that exist, then the court may impute knowledge.
51
 Warner was applied in R v 
Wright,
52
 where the defendant threw a tin can out of a car which was found to contain cannabis. He 
claimed that he had done so at the driver’s request, but had not known that anyone in the car had 
drugs. He admitted that on being told to throw the tin away, he had suspected that the tin might 
contain drugs. The trial judge directed the jury that possession meant simply custody and control. 
The defendant was convicted and on appeal, the Court of Appeal, allowing the appeal, held that the 
conviction must be quashed because the jury had been wrongly directed. MacKenna J stated: 
 
“If a person is handed a container and at the moment when he receives it does not know or 
suspect, and has no reason to suspect, that it contains drugs, and if, before he has time to 
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examine the contents, he is told to throw it away and immediately does so, he cannot, in our 
opinion, be said to have been in possession of the drugs which happened to be inside the 
container so as to be guilty of an offence…. This is so even though the instruction to throw 
away the container, which he instantly obeyed, made him suspect that there was something 
wrong about its contents. That was the defence by which the appellant Wright sought to meet 
the prosecution’s case and if the jury accepted it, or thought that it might possibly have been 
true, they should have acquitted him. The judge ought to have given the jury a direction to 
this effect. He did not do so, and the failure was a fatal defect.”53 
 
Thus, if a person is handed a container but at that moment he does not know or suspect, and has no 
reason to suspect, that it contains prohibited object or substances, and he is then instructed to throw 
it away and immediately does so, he has not been in possession even though the command to throw 
it away gave rise to suspicion. 
 
Continuous Possession 
Possession can be a continuous act or state of affairs, depending on the factual circumstances of the 
case under consideration. For instance, it may be the case that possession has not been disrupted 
merely because the defendant has forgotten the objects or substances existence, and the policy of 
the law is that once an item is on the defendant’s possession it remains until possession is disrupted 
or terminated.  In R v Buswell,
54
 the defendant who was under treatment for drug addiction was 
given amphetamine tablets on a prescription. He put the tablets in the pocket of his jeans. Later 
when he could not find the tablets and discovered that his jeans had been washed he concluded that 
the tablets had been dissolved in the wash. Accordingly he went to his doctor and was given a 
second prescription for tablets to replace those that he believed had been destroyed: in fact they 
were in the back of a drawer in his room. Ten months later, after the end of his course of treatment, 
the defendant rediscovered the tablets in the drawer. He consumed some of them and the police 
found him in possession of the remainder. The defendant was convicted of being unlawfully in 
possession of controlled drugs. On appeal against his conviction, the Court of Appeal allowing the 
appeal, held that where a person mislaid an item or thought erroneously that it had been destroyed 
or disposed of, if in fact it remained in his care and control he did not lose possession. 
Consequently, the defendant remained in possession of the tablets by virtue of the original 
prescription, his possession was lawful and the conviction was quashed. Thus, possession in the 
construction of criminal liability does not depend on the defendants powers of memory. 
 
In R v Martindale,
55
 a small amount of cannabis resin was found in the wallet of the defendant, who 
claimed to have forgotten about it. Notwithstanding that it was found two years after he had first 
come into possession of it, he was deemed to have possession. He was charged with unlawful 
possession. The defendant sought a ruling on whether he had a valid defence on the assumption that 
he had been given the drug over two years previously in Canada, that he did not smoke cannabis, 
and had completely forgotten about it so that he could not be said to be in possession. The trial 
judge held that the assumed facts could not constitute a defence, so the defendant pleaded guilty and 
was convicted. He appealed against the conviction on the ground that possession did not exist in the 
absence of knowledge of the item’s presence and nature, and furthermore that knowledge did not 
exist if the defendant had forgotten that he had the article in his possession. Lord Lane C.J. stated: 
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“It is true that a man does not necessarily possess every article which he may have in his 
pocket. If for example some evil minded person secretly slips a portion of cannabis resin into 
the pocket of another without the other’s knowledge, the other is not in law in possession of 
the cannabis....Here the appellant himself put the cannabis in his wallet knowing what it was 
and put the wallet into his pocket. In our judgment, subject to the authorities, to which 
reference will have to be made in a moment, he remained in possession, even though his 
memory of the presence of the drug had faded or disappeared altogether. Possession does not 
depend upon the alleged possessor’s powers of memory. Nor does possession come and go as 
memory revives or fails. If it were to do so, a man with a poor memory would be acquitted, he 
with the good memory would be convicted.”56  
 
On the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal upholding the conviction, held that although a 
defendant did not necessarily possess every article which he might have in his pockets, possession 
did not depend on the powers of memory of the defendant and did not come and go as memory 
revived and faded. Consequently, since the defendant had himself placed the controlled drug in his 
wallet he was then in possession of it and he remained in possession even though his memory of its 
presence had faded. 
 
Objects or Substances Found on Land or Premises 
If prohibited objects or substances are found on the defendants land or in premises that he owns or 
controls he is deemed in law to possess those items.
57
 This issue was exemplified by Davitt P. in 
Minister for Posts and Telegraphs v Campbell
58
 where the High Court per Davitt P held that the 
prosecutor had not discharged the onus of showing that the defendant kept the item, in this case an 
unlicensed television, or had it in his possession either actual or constructive and further that the 
District Justice accordingly was correct in law in dismissing the charge against the defendant. 
Likewise, in The People (DPP) v Foley,
59
 the Court of Criminal Appeal per Budd J opined: 
 
“Was there sufficient evidence in the transcript from which the court of trial could reasonably 
have drawn the inference that the applicant intended to exercise control, either exclusively or 
in common design with others, over the shotgun? On the authorities it is clear that the finding 
of an unlicensed firearm hidden in a person’s car is not proof of his possession of it unless the 
prosecution proves that he knew the gun was there; moreover, of itself, the presence of an 
article on the accused’s property will not give rise to an inference of possession. However, 
there are circumstances where an inference of knowledge and control can be drawn from the 
open and obvious presence of an article in circumstances where the accused’s relationship to 
it would lead to a conclusion that he had knowledge of its presence.”60 
 
The issue will depend on whether the court may infer knowledge and control from the 
circumstances of the case under consideration in which the prohibited items were found. In cases, 
such as Foley where the defendant was in close proximity to the firearms that were on open display, 
the proximity of the defendant to the prohibited items will make the inference more likely. 
 
Common Design and Possession Offences 
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Possession offences may involve a common design, or joint enterprise, whereby possession of the 
prohibited items may be shared among several people.
61
 If a defendant acquired the prohibited 
objects or substance or substance in pursuance of a common design then he does this on behalf of 
all co-defendants to the joint enterprise who are deemed to have joint possession and each may be 
convicted accordingly.
62
 In The People (DPP) v O’Neill,63 five defendants and one co-defendant 
were tried in the Special Criminal Court for offences of possession of explosive substances in such 
circumstances as to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that they did not have them in their 
possession for a lawful purpose and having the substance in their possession with intent to endanger 
life or to cause serious injury to property. The five defendants were convicted. On appeal, the Court 
of Criminal Appeal held that the court had to determine the appropriate inference to be drawn from 
the facts and that on the evidence it was reasonable to find that the defendants were engaged upon a 
common purpose and there was ample evidence that the defendants conduct were criminal offences. 
Furthermore, without a finding of common enterprise it is difficult to infer common knowledge but 
in the absence of any explanation by the defendants it was impossible to conclude that the activities 
of the defendants were other than central to the business of preparing explosives and that they must 
be held to have had possession of them. The defendants appeal was dismissed. 
 
Possession Offences and Preventive Justice 
Possession holds a unique position in the criminal law and can also be a form of preventive 
justice.
64 The imposition of criminal liability has been increasingly used for the purpose of 
preventing or reducing the risk of anticipated future harm typically criminalising prohibited conduct 
at an early stage. Criminal possession, especially of controlled drugs, has been a major source of 
controversy, as this mode of liability allows for arrests and convictions without necessarily proving 
the use or sale of a controlled substance. In order to mitigate the possibility that innocent persons 
might be prosecuted and convicted for possession offences it is essential that the prosecution’s 
evidence includes more than just a temporal and spatial nexus between the defendant and the 
prohibited item. 
 
Conclusion 
Possession offences are specifically designed for ease of enforcement thus reflecting an approach to 
criminal liabiliy with an emphasis on crime control. These offences are, as a geneal rule, consistent 
with situational liability in that the prosecution do not have to establish the voluntarily taking 
possession of the prohibited object or substance. It is sufficient to establish the defendant was in 
psossesion. Whether or not possesison offences are consistent with the voluntary act requirement, 
criminal liability is nonetheless imposed on the basis that the defendant voluntarily remined in 
possesion. 
 
Possession offences may potentially circumvent traditional notions of imputed liability through the 
doctrine of constructive possession, which accommodates vicarious liability (through dominion 
over a person) and spatial liability (through dominion over an area). These offences resist 
categorisation according to the traditional distinction between conduct and status offences. 
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Moreover, they challenge the traditional distinction between voluntariness and mens rea in the 
construction of ciminal liability.  
